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Abstract: A supply chain is two or more parties linked by a flow of goods,
information and funds. Since this means that supply chain management concerns
environments in which there are multiple decision makers, which may be different
firms or different divisions within a single firm, attention has to be focused on
methods or mechanisms that improve system efficiencies. The reason for this is that in
a supply chain setting, behaviour that is locally rational can be inefficient from a
global perspective.
In this paper we will focus on the use of a negotiated two-part tariff for internal
pricing as a means to achieve “channel co-ordination”. The two-part internal pricing
scheme can be thought of both as a means of handling risk sharing within a supply
chain and to avoid the problem of double marginalization.
1 Introduction
A supply chain is two or more parties linked by a flow of goods, information and
funds. Since this means that supply chain management concerns environments in
which there are multiple decision makers, which may be different firms or different
divisions within a single firm, attention has to be focused on methods or mechanisms
that improve system efficiencies. The reason for this is that in a supply chain setting,
behaviour that is locally rational can be inefficient from a global perspective. One
way of achieving improved system efficiency is through contractual arrangements.
In the first-best case total expected supply chain profits is maximised. This can be
achieved if all decisions are made by a single decision-maker with access to all
available information. This corresponds to a supply chain with centralised control.
However, in a supply chain, this situation is highly unlikely to occur since normally
none of the parties involved is in a position to control the entire supply chain. Thus
we are left with a situation in which the supply chain control is decentralised and
where each party involved in the supply chain has private information and individual
objectives.
In the case where the total profit encountered through decentralised control is lower
than the total profit for the first best solution, the decentralised control mechanism
used is regarded as inefficient. There are several objectives that are of importance in
the design of the control mechanisms in a supply chain. One objective is risk sharing,
where contracts are focused on how the total system profit should be allocated among
the supply chain parties. The reason for calling this focus a risk-sharing objective is
that it provides means for the parties to share the risks arising from various sources of
uncertainty.
Other contracts are more focused on reducing the difference between the total profit
in a decentralised system and the total profit in the first-best solution. Contracts in
which this is the main emphasis are said to focus on system wide performance and the
normal terminology for the objective used is channel co-ordination.
In the excellent survey article by Tsay et al. (1999), the means for achieving
channel co-ordination and/or risk sharing are used to classify the literature on supply
chain contracts. This classification uses the following categories.
• specification of decision rights
• pricing
• minimum purchase commitments
• quantity flexibility
• buyback or return policies
• allocation rules
• lead time
• quality
In this paper we will focus on internal pricing as a way to achieve supply chain co-
ordination. We will suggest the use of negotiated two part tariffs to achieve the co-
ordination goal which is in line with the suggestions made by Moorthy (1987) in his
comment on the article by Jeuland and Shugan (1983). However, the idea on how the
two part tariffs to be used in the pricing scheme are to be derived is based on an idea
by Lantz (2000). In Lantz negotiation scheme the prices to be used among the parties
are decided by negotiations on a two-part tariff. Lantz has shown that this negotiation
scheme may converge to a situation in which the seller sets the linear part of the two-
part tariff to the marginal cost of production and the fixed fee of the tariff allocates the
profit among the participants according to their negotiation power. Hence, the scheme
may result in a situation in which the problem of double marginalization is avoided
and the profits are distributed in a “fair” way. The reason for using the statement
“may converge” is that the results of negotiations are dependent upon the starting
conditions, i.e. the transfer pricing scheme used in the outset of the negotiations.
2 Pricing as a contract clause in supply chain co-ordination
In the early literature on inventory control, the pricing scheme to be used in order to
co-ordinate the chain is not subject to negotiations among the parties involved.
However there exists a substantial literature on the use of quantity discounts as a
means to achieve better channel co-ordination. Monahan (1984, Lee and Rosenblatt
(1985, 1986), Parlar and Wang (1995), Lal and Staelin (1984) and Gupta and Kini
(1995), just to mention a few. In most of these articles the profit is solely allocated to
the seller with the exception of the article by Rosenblatt and Lee (1985), in which
both parties benefit from the discount schedule. In the marketing literature, the paper
by Jeuland and Shugan (1983) presents a two-member channel and shows how a
discount-pricing scheme can be used to achieve channel co-ordination. However, in a
comment to the Jeuland and Shugan paper, Moorthy argues that the channel co-
ordination suggested by the authors can be achieved by the use of a two part tariff and
that this co-ordination scheme is simpler and hence easier to implement. Also,
Moorthy shows that the two-part tariff separates the co-ordination problem from the
profit sharing problem. Since Moorthy’s ideas in some sense form the basis for our
suggestion, we will further comment on Moorthy’s co-ordination scheme.
In the more recent literature on pricing and supply chain contracts, several
extensions of the classical models have been presented. Weng (1995, 1997) extends
the Jeuland Shugan model in several directions and shows among other things that a
quantity discount scheme for the buyer along with a franchise fee paid to the supplier
is sufficient to achieve channel co-ordination. Hence, Weng suggests a fixed fee
element to be used together with a quantity discount scheme. One of the drawbacks
with most of the pricing schemes presented in the literature is that most of them focus
on a supply chain consisting of two members; a buyer and a supplier.
In the recent paper by Lee and Whang (1999), the authors present a number of
properties that are of interest when designing co-ordination mechanisms in supply
chains. These are the cost conservation property, the incentive compatibility and the
informational decentralizability property. The cost conservation property states that
the accounting system built into a co-ordination scheme should trace all costs to the
individual sites. The incentive compatibility property means that the scheme should
eliminate potential misalignment problems. Finally, the informational
decentralizability property states that the scheme should be implementable using site
information only. Using these desired properties, we argue that a negotiated two-part
tariff co-ordination scheme might be the answer. One of the reasons for this is its
simplicity, which makes it possible to use in situations where the supply chain
consists of more than two parties and hence most of the co-ordination schemes
suggested in the literature becomes too complicated or are not applicable.
3 Moorthy’s comment on the Jeuland Shugan article
In his comment on the Jeuland and Shugan article, Moorthy states that there are
several pricing schemes that can be used to achieve channel co-ordination. The
necessary and sufficient conditions for channel co-ordination is that the
manufacturer’s pricing policy makes the retailers effective marginal cost curve cut his
marginal revenue curve from below at the channels optimal quantity. Hence, the
manufacturer’s pricing scheme need not even be a quantity discount scheme. Moorthy
shows that by using a two-part tariff in which the manufacturer charges his true
marginal costs in the linear part of the tariff, channel co-ordination is achieved and the
fixed fee is used only to determine the profit sharing. Jeuland and Shugan criticised
the two-part tariff suggested by Moorthy on the grounds that if, because of some short
term problem of scheduling production, the manufacturer delivers only a fraction of
what the retailer wishes to purchase, then the manufacturer suffers no penalty at all.
However, Moorthy clearly states that this criticism is non-valid since it is easy to
negotiate a protection from shortfall of production clause into the contract. Moorthy
suggests the following clause “ if the manufacturer fails to supply the ordered quantity
in any month, then the retailer will be entitled to a refund of the fixed payment in an
amount sufficient to maintain the retailers share of the channel’s profit plus any
accrued interest on the excess amount already paid ....”.
In our scheme we suggest that this clause can be replaced by a negotiated two-part
tariff working in the other direction than the first one does. What we mean by this is
that the first negotiated two-part tariff stipulates the selling price, the linear part of the
tariff preferably set as the marginal cost of the manufacturer, whereas the fixed fee in
this tariff gives the profit sharing among the parties. This tariff is in use in the normal
situation when the ordered quantities are promptly delivered. The second negotiated
transfer price tariff works in the short fall situation. Here it is important that the
manufacturer gets the information of the true short fall costs for the retailer, i.e. the
retailer’s true shortage cost. This is the preferred linear part in the second negotiated
two-part tariff. The fixed fee in this tariff serves the purpose of redistributing the
channel profit among the parties according to who is to blame. However, like the
former fixed fee, it will also reflect the negotiation skills/powers of the parties.
The multiple two-part tariff scheme suggested can easily be generalised to a
situation in which the supply chain has more than two members.
4 Lantz‘ negotiation scheme
In his thesis, Lantz suggests that negotiated two-part tariff should be used as internal
prices. The way the negotiation works is that starting from a given position with a
fixed and neutral internal pricing tariff, each of the involved parties can suggest a new
two-part tariff. The new suggested tariff is announced to the other party in terms of a
fixed fee, F, a linear unit price part, p, and an order quantity, Q. The suggestion of the
new tariff is based on the suggesting party’s private information. This means that the
new tariff is certainly favourable to him in comparison with the former tariff. The
responding party can accept or reject the suggested tariff. If the new tariff is accepted
it must be favourable also to the other party. The negotiations continue until no
further change in the two-part tariff is suggested. A rejection of a suggested tariff
means that the parties involved for the moment stick to the old tariff.
Lantz has tested the negotiation scheme by letting students negotiate a two-part
tariff in a situation in which the manufacturer has private information on his cost
structure and the retailer has private information regarding the demand structure. In
his experiments the results are promising and the negotiations lead to a better channel
co-ordination.
We have done the same type of experiments with students in the production and
logistics courses at NHH with the same type of results.
5 The suggested use of two-sided negotiated two-part tariffs
Since we, apart from the two-part tariff negotiation scheme suggested by Lantz, also
make use of a reverse negotiated two-part tariff in order to handle shortfall in delivery
problems, we are able to handle situations in which the parties involved have different
attitudes towards risk. Agrawal and Seshardi have shown that a two-part tariff can be
used for risk intermediation in a supply chain. Our two-part tariff scheme works as
follows.
Starting from a neutral position in terms of tariffs used for deliveries and
backorders, the parties negotiate as in Lantz’ scheme, but now negotiating two
different two-part tariffs.
1. Each of the involved parties can suggest a new two-part tariff to be used for
deliveries from the manufacturer to the retailer consisting of a fixed fee, F, a
unit price, p, and an order quantity, Q. The other party may accept or reject the
proposal.
2. Each party may also suggest a new two-part tariff to be used in terms of
shortfall. This new two-part tariff consists of a fixed fee, Φ, and a unit shortage
price, π, to be used when the ordered products are not delivered promptly.
This system of negotiated two-part tariffs can easily be generalised to a situation
where the supply chain consists of more than two parties. Furthermore, the
suggestions for new tariffs are made using private information only and each party
can, given the tariffs to be used, base their decisions on the tariffs and their own
private information.
6 Conclusions and future research
We are currently constructing a negotiation game consisting of a supply chain with
three parties where the retailer in the chain faces uncertain demand. This will be used
in testing if the participants in the game can reach a situation that co-ordinates the
channel based on the two types of two-part tariffs suggested in this paper. Apart from
this, we will also analyse how our scheme works in situations were other pricing
schemes have been suggested in the literature and try to determine the pros and cons
of the suggested pricing scheme.
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